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A SUGGESTED PRIVILEGE FOR CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS WITH MARRIAGE
COUNSELLORS
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a large growth in the numbers and ac-
tivities of marriage counsellors. Although marriage counselling has long
been practiced as an informal art by people in all walks of life, only in the
past twenty-five years has it achieved stature as a profession.'
Marriage counselling's major aim, as the name implies, is to aid
spouses in understanding the nature of their marital difficulties. A prime
desire is the prevention of divorce, but failing this, the objective is to aid
in the adjustment of the partners to that contingency.2 Clients' problems
may run the gamut from simple personality idiosyncrasies or health com-
plications to infertility, impotence, homosexuality, alcoholism, frigidity and
infidelity.3 Aside from the relatively minor amount of information which
the counsellor might be able to glean by observation, the great majority
of his knowledge of the client must come from personal discussion.4 The
therapeutic value to the client, in fact, springs to a great extent from his
opportunity to talk over his problems with a sympathetic listener.5 At the
same time, he is given the benefit of sharing in the counsellor's broad
understanding of the problems and possible solutions of marital difficulties.
It is apparent that much of the information divulged by the client
may be highly relevant evidence in subsequent litigation, particularly marital
actions. Ordinarily, of course, a person may not testify concerning the
substance of statements made to him by another where such evidence is
offered to prove the truth of the statements.6 But there are many excep-
tions to the hearsay rule,7 including admissions by parties,8 witnesses'
1. See MUDD, THE PRACTICE OP MARRIAGE COUNSELLING 4-8 (1951) (hereinafter
cited as MUDD).
2. Johnstone, Marriage Counselling Services in Kansas and Kansas City, Mis-
souri, 3 KAN. L. REv. 116, 117 (1954). "Marriage counselling offers no guarantees.
But in many cases it offers more hope of an intelligent, permanent solution to marital
problems than either divorce without counselling or reconciliation without counselling."
Ibid.
3. MUDD 67.
4. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 117.
5. See MUDD 178-79. "Renember that in zost in-stances the person seeking help
is the one who does the work. He is offered the opportunity . . . [of using] the coun-
sellor as an objective sounding board .... [A]Ilowed to do this . . . in the majority
of instances he will be able to change his attitudes and develop new and unused parts
of himself." MUD 40-41.
6. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIG-
MoIRE); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENcE 460 (1954) (hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK);
UNvoRm RULES or EviDENcE rule 63.
7. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE 208-09; UNIrORm RULES Ov EVIDENcE rule 63(1)-(31).
8. E.g., UNIVORm RULES or EVIDENCE rule 63 (7).
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declarations against interest,9 and declarants' statements offered to show
state of mind.10 Thus, for example, a statement by the client of past mis-
conduct, either bearing on the validity of the marriage or on the presence
of recognized grounds for divorce, would be admissible in a marital action
between the spouses." Similarly, vilification of the spouse might be offered
to prove lack of affection. If relevant, the counsellor's testimony as -to
these statements could also be used in third-party and criminal actions in
addition to marital litigation.
Otherwise relevant and admissible statements may be withheld from
disclosure, however, if the law recognizes the relationship between the
communicants as privileged,'12 and the statements are made in confidence.
At present, the relationships of husband-wife, 13 attorney-client, 14 and physi-
cian-patient 15 are generally accorded a privilege, while the penitent's con-
fessions to his priest have received substantial statutory protection.16 In
addition, there has been pressure exerted by other groups, in most cases
unavailing,' 7 for the statutory enactment of privileges for their professions.
Included among these are privileges for communications to journalists, ac-
countants, social workers and public officials.' 8 Although the trend of the
law is probably toward the narrowing of existing privileges rather than
the granting of new ones,19 it is, nevertheless, surprising that the profession
9. E.g., id. rule 63(10).
10. E.g., id. rule 63(12).
11. 8 Wiooaz 64, 531.
12. 8 WiG Mo, 106. The legal result of this recognition is that the communigait
can prevent admission of the statements into evidence in a court or in other quasi-
judicial proceedings. For a general discussion of the privilege for confidential com-
munications, see 8 WiGmoas, §§ 2285-89; McCoRmcx 151-64; Note, Privileged Com-
inunications--Some Recent Developments, 5 VAxp. L. R . 590 (1952).
13. It has been stated that the husband-wife privilege derived from the common
law. Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897) ; McCoRMIcK 169-70. It is now ee-
ognized by statute in most states. For compiled statutes, see 2 WIcmosZ, § 488. See
UNIFORm RuLS OF EVIDENcE rule 28. For the general scope of the privilege, see 8
WIGMORZ, §§ 2332-41; McCoRMICK 168-80.
14. This is the oldest of the recognized privileges. Wigmore states the general
principle: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to the purpose,
(4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently pro-
tected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the pro-
tection be waived." 8 WiGmOR 558. The privilege is recognized by statute in many
jurisdictions. Ibid. See also UNIFORt RuLS OF EVIDnNC rule 26.
15. The physician-patient privilege was not recognized at common law but has
been enacted by statute in thirty-one states. MCCORMICK 211. Statutes are collected
in 8 WIGmORS, § 2380 n.5. It is embodied in the UNIFORM RULps oF EvmNCE rle
27, although in brackets, the explanation for which being the commissioners' doubts
as to its advisability. McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules,
33 TUxAs L. Rxv. 559, 570-71 (1955). See in general Note, The Physician-Patient
Privilege, 58 W. VA. L. Rsv. 76 (1955); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDs OF J3DI-
CLAL ADMINISTRATIO 342-44 (1949).
16. This privilege was not recognized at common law. 8 WIGMOR4 843. It is flow
protected by statute in thirty-one states. Id. § 2395 n.1. It is embodied in the UNI-
FORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 29.
17. See Note, 5 VAND. L. Rrv. 590 (1952); VANDEMILT, MINIMUM STAND4RDS
OF JUDIcIAL ADMINIsTRATION 342-44 (1949).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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of marriage counselling, which requires a high degree of client confidence
for its effective operation, has received substantially no consideration as a
possible candidate for this protection.
The question does not appear to have arisen in litigation in this
country,20 but English cases recognize that communications made by
estranged spouses to a third party attempting a reconciliation are privileged,
at least in a subsequent divorce proceeding.2 1 Since practitioners of mar-
riage counselling frequently have other professional backgrounds including
law, medicine and the ministry,- it is possible that the client could claim
the privilege associated with his counsellor's primary profession. Never-
theless, if marriage counselling requires a privilege to be effective, and if
there is sufficient benefit to be obtained by the public in encouraging its
acceptance, this privilege should extend to all who are qualified to practice
its methods.
PROTECTION AFFORDED MARRIAGE COUNSELLING COMMUNICATIONS
BY EXISTING PRIVILEGES
Recent data of the American Association of Marriage Counsellors in-
dicates that forty-eight per cent of its members are doctors and eight
and one-half per cent are clergymen.2 In addition, a number of lawyers
necessarily practice marriage counselling to a limited extent in the course
of their general duties? 4 Since more than half of the marriage counsellors
already have a privilege by virtue of their "primary" profession, it might
be asked why a special privilege for their counselling services is needed.
One answer, of course, is that the remainder of those presently engaged
in professionaliy recognized counselling are social workers, sociologists,
psychologists and educators,2 5 none of whom have a generally recognized
privilege.26 Moreover, it is not clear that a doctor, minister, or lawyer
who practices marriage counselling can invoke the privilege when he strays
from the strict limits of his privileged vocation. Thus it has been sug-
20. Ungar, Privilege anid the Marriage Counsellor, 5 BROOKLYN BAR. 49, 52
(-1953).
21. Henley v. Henley, [1955] 1 All E.R. 590 (P.D.A.); Broome v. Broome,
[1955] 1 All E.R. 201 (P.D.A. 1954) ; Pool v. Pool, [1951] 2 All E.R. 563 (P.D.A.) ;
Mole v. Mole, [1950] 2 All E.R. 328 (C.A.); McTaggart v. McTaggart [1948] 2
All E.R. 754 (C.A.). But see Bostock v. Bostock, [1950] 1 All E.R. 25 (P.D.A.
1949) (apparently overruled by Pool v. Pool, supra).
22. See text at notes 23-24 infra.
23. MTJDD 70-71. Other professions represented were as follows: 12y2% social
workers, 122o% sociologists, 10% educators and 8V,4% psychologists. The figures cited
were for the end of 1950.
24. MARIANO, A PSYCHOANALYTic LAWYER LooKs AT MARRIAGE AND DIvoRc4
(1952); Mariano, Legal Therapy in Divorce, 3 KAN. L. Riv. 36, 37-40 (1954).
25. See note 23 supra.
26. Despite some pressure in that direction, there has been no privilege granted for
social workers. Psychologists have been granted a privilege by statute in Georgia and
Kentucky. No privilege has been found to have been suggested for sociologists or edu-
cators. See Note, Privileged Communications-Some Recent Developments, 5 VAND. L.
Rzv. 590 (1952).
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gested that although psychiatrists are doctors, communications to them
may not be within the medical privilege in states where licensing acts do
not apply to treatment of mental disorders and the privilege-granting statute
refers to "licensed physicians." 27 Alternatively, psychotherapy may not
be construed as "practicing" medicine.28  These arguments apply with
additional force to the psychiatrist who practices marriage counselling
where there may be no element of mental disorder.29 On the other hand,
those doctors who are not psychiatrists but gynecologists, urologists or
simply general practitioners,O may be deprived of their usual privilege
on the grounds that marriage counselling is outside the scope of their
medical duties.
The same considerations apply to the lawyer-client and priest-penitent
relationships. Unless divorce action had actually been filed or was clearly
contemplated, it could be argued with some force that marriage counselling
was not within the scope of the lawyer's legal duties. An analogous situa-
tion is found in those cases which hold that the lawyer who handles his
client's accounting problems may not invoke the privilege for that branch
of his activities.3 ' The minister faces the same problems, for his privilege
is intended to extend only to confessionals required by the canons of his
church.3 2  Information given to clergymen outside the confessional has
been held not to be privileged.33
Another impediment to the application of existing privileges to mar-
riage counselling communications is the problem of waiver, that is, the effect
of the presence of a third person, in this case the other spouse, on the
privilege of confidentiality with the counsellor. Marriage counsellors main-
tain that there is often value to be had through joint interviews with the
spouses. 4 But in most situations the presence of a third person destroys
a privilege on the reasoning that the communication could not have been
27. See Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist
and Patient, 28 IND. L. Rzv. 32, 37 (1952).
28. Guttmacher & Weihofen, supra note 27, at 37-39.
29. See text at notes 53-54 infra.
30. A breakdown of the membership of the American Association of Marriage
Counsellors in 1950 -showed that of the 48% who were physicians, only 17% were
psychiatrists, the other classifications being 27% gynecologists, 2% urologists and 2%
general medicine. MUDD 70-71.
31. See, e.g., Oleander v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954); United
States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). Cf. MCCORMICK 184-85.
32. The Uniform Rules of Evidence provide a privilege for "penitential commun-
ications." "'[P]enitential communication' means a confession of culpable conduct made
... to a priest in the course of discipline or practice of the church. . . ." UNIvORm
RULES OF EVIDEXNCE rule 29(1) (c). See also 8 WiG OR, §§ 2394-96; Regan & Macart-
ney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 3, 14
(1956).
33. E.g., It re Koeller's Estate, 162 Kan. 395, 176 P.2d 544 (1947) ; Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 221 S.W.2d 87 (1949). The latter problem is probably
more theoretical than practical since it would be questionable tactics, at least in jury
cases, for the attorney to attempt to force a priest to divulge information which he felt
had been given in confidence. See Regan & Macartney, supra note 32, at 14.
34. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 116-17; MUDD 189.
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intended to be confidential.35 If two people consult an attorney for their
mutual benefit, the communications are confidential as between the com-
municants and others not a party to the conference, but are not privileged
as between themselves. 3 For example, if spouses confer with an attorney
to arrange a contract between themselves neither is allowed to invoke the
lawyer-client privilege against the other
7
The marriage counselling conference would seem to require a contrary
result. If full advantage is to be gained from joint discussions with the
counsellor, communications in the conference should be privileged as against
all parties thereto.8 An analogy is perhaps offered by the exclusion from
evidence of offers of compromise, which McCormick explains as a privilege
in the interests of encouraging settlements.39 Nevertheless, as the law
stands, waiver is an effective bar.
SHOULD A MARRIAGE COUNSELLING PRIVILEGE BE RECOGNIZED?
A convenient framework within which to explore the desirability of
a marriage counselling privilege are the four criteria advanced by Wigmore:
"(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must be essen-
tial to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and (4) The injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal
of litigation." 40
Do the Statements Arise in Confidence?
In the case of any professional consultation, it is reasonably clear that
the client tacitly assumes that any statement made during the conversation
will not be disclosed. This springs not from the nature of the statements
but from a general awareness of professional ethics.4 ' Whether state-
ments will be legally recognized as confidential must rest on the usual
circumstances and types of information offered in the given professional
relation. The inference of confidence is strongest in -the priest-penitent
relation where the information elicited is required and consists of a
35. See, e.g., MCCORAMICK 192 (lawyer-client); 8 WIG-ORE, § 2336 (husband-
wife).
36. McCoRm1ficK 177.
37. See Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa. 420, 105 A.2d 122 (1954). Cf. Knox v. Knox, 222
Minn. 477, 25 N.W.2d 225 (1946).
38. This view has support in the English cases. Pool v. Pool, [1951] 2 All E.R.
563 (P.D.A.) ; Harris v. Harris [1931] Prob. 10. See also O'Brien v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 Kan. 138, 142, 197 P.2d 1100 (1921) (dictum) ; Comment, 34
MICH. L. Rnv. 875 (1936).
39. McCORMICK 158.
40. 8 WIGMORE 531.
41. Cf. GUTTMACHER & WXIHOEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 274 (1952).
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confession. To a somewhat lesser extent this is true of the lawyer-
client relation which may involve highly personal data revealed because
of impending litigation. The doctor-patient privilege, on the other hand,
has been severely criticized as involving physical data rarely kept secret
from others.42  Moreover, there is generally no thought of litigation which
would impart a need for confidence.43
The objections to the physician-patient privilege appear to be met in
marriage counselling. Like the lawyer, the marriage counsellor in order
to be effective must learn a great deal through prolonged discussions. This
process requires a thorough exploration into the conduct and attitudes of
both parties.44 There is, moreover, a natural reticence to speak of the
intimate relations associated with the marriage. This reticence may often
be strengthened by the realization, as in the lawyer-client relation, that
litigation is not far removed. Thus the person who seeks marriage coun-
selling in all probability has recognized that divorce is often the legal result
of an unsatisfactory union. By virtue of the nature of the communications
and the circumstances under which they are given, marriage counselling
comes close to the legal relationship in its intended confidence.
Is Confidentiality Essential to the Full and Satisfactory Maintenance
of the Relation?
There is general agreement that this criterion is met by the lawyer-
client and husband-wife relations.4 Once again, however, the physician-
patient relationship has been strongly challenged in that the information
required for effective treatment is seldom confidential, 4 and because people
would seek medical aid in the absence of a privilege.4
7
Unlike the doctor who may be able to treat his patient despite the
fact that the latter is uncommunicative, the marriage counsellor requires
extended discussion with his client. And unlike the lawyer who needs
information which his client will probably recognize as having a logical
relation to the legal problem, the counsellor must encourage the client
to discuss events which the client may deem totally unrelated to his
marriage difficulties. In this respect the marriage counsellor's need for
information compares with that of a psychiatrist.48
42. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORZ 812; McCORMIcK 222.
43. An exception arises in those cases in which the patient intends to sue for per-
sonal injuries. These latter situations are justifiably excluded from privilege under the
terms of most statutes. See, e.g., UNInORM RUiLs OF EVIDsNCe rule 27(4) ; CAL. CODE
CIv. PROC. ANNOTATIONS § 1881 (West 1955); 8 WIG..ORE 812; McCoRMIcx 222.
But McCormick states that courts have been reluctant to make this exception in the
absence of statutory demands. McComiucK 220.
44. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 117. Cf. MuDD 203-08.
45. But see MCCORMICK 179: ". . . the probable benefits of the rule of privilege
in encouraging marital confidences and wedded harmony, is at best doubtful and mar-
ginal."
46. 8 WiGMOR 811.
47. Ibid.
48. Both disciplines require extended discussion not only in order to get at the
root of the difficulty, but also as a part of the therapy itself. See text and notes at
notes 4-5 supra; text and notes at notes 49-57 ilfra.
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Of the psychiatrist-patient relation it has been said that "the peculiarly
close relationship of trust and confidence required in psychotherapy makes
the situation a special one, not necessarily governed by the same con-
siderations as ordinary doctor-patient relations." 49 This difference has
been recognized in at least one case where a privilege was granted for
psychiatrists in the absence of a privilege for doctors in general 0° In
addition, two states have enacted statutes giving a privilege to psy-
chologists. 5' Marriage counsellors make use primarily of the knowledge.
and techniques of the behavioral sciences, particularly psychiatry and psy-
chology.5 2  The essential difference between counselling and psychiatry
lies in the complexity of the latter's psychotherapeutic techniques.53  Thus,
the emotional overtones of a marriage relation may be disturbed, but they
are not necessarily the same conflicts which produce neurosis.54 The
marriage counsellor carries on his client discussions at the conscious level
and is primarily interested in the inter-personal relationship between the
spouses.55 If the root of the difficulty is identified as a neurosis of one of
the partners, reference is usually made to a psychiatrist. Thus the coun-
sellor does not require the confidence of the client to probe into his sub-
conscious thoughts,-56 and in this respect his need for a privilege is not so
great as the psychiatrist's. 57 On the other hand, it has been indicated
that in a large percentage of the cases referred to counselling, the more
emotionally mature spouse has instigated the relationship and the real
difficulty lies with the other partner.58 If the marriage is to be helped, the
counsellor must do a thorough job of selling himself to the spouse who did
not originate the relation. The element of complete confidence would
appear essential in this situation. So strong is the need that the counsellor
may feel it imperative to volunteer advance assurance to the client that
strict confidence will be observed. 59 Furthermore, the a priori possibility
of litigation in the divorce courts makes the counsellor's information
gathering process perhaps more difficult than the psychiatrist's; in this
respect it is closer to the attorney-client relationship.
49. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOVEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 270 (1952).
50. Binder v. Ruvell, Civil No. 25C2535, Cook Co. Circuit Ct. (II.) June 24,
1952; Note, Confidertial Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial
Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. Rv. 384 (1952). See also Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d
399 (D.C. Cir. 1955), in which testimony of a state employed psychiatrist was held
privileged under the medical statute, but the language of the court emphasized the spe-
cial need for a privilege in the psychotherapy field. 4 KAN. L. Rzv. 597, 54 MICH. L.
IZv. 423 (1956).
51. Kentucky and Georgia. See GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1955) ; Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 319.100 (1953).
52. Johnstone, supra note 2, at 116.
53. See MUDD 203-08.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272, 279 (1952).
58. Mudd, The Social Worker's Function in Divorce Proceedings, 18 LAW & CON-
TEMIP. PROB. 66, 70 (1954).
59. MUDD 39, 182-83.
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Is the Relation One Which in the Opinion of the Community
Ought To Be Sedulously Fostered?
There is universal agreement that all the professional relationships
which are generally privileged at present should be "sedulously fostered."
Formal marriage counselling, on the other hand, is new and for the most
part untried. It is an example of activities which were at one time handled
within the family but which now, due largely to the increased specialization
of our economy, are being shared with the community60 It has been
described as a community facility which has developed to promote personal
and marital adjustment.61 Whether or not as a profession it should receive
a privilege, however, depends in part on the community's judgment of its
ability to fulfill a need. The divorce rate furnishes the need if marriage
counselling can prove effective in lowering it.
Divorce-The Problem
At the present time there is one divorce for approximately every
four marriages.P In 1946, the high level year, there were 610,000; in
recent years the number has been consistently close to 400,000 but the
divorce rate has been increasing.63 It has been estimated that divorce
cases make up approximately one-half of all civil suits filed in the
courts of first instance. 4  Unfortunately, marriage problems, unlike
medical problems, necessarily involve at least two people, and in most
cases involve the futures of minor children. For a large segment of the
population, therefore, a divorce can create an economic as well as a social
situation having impact upon the remainder of the community. Indeed, it
has been suggested that society has an interest in every marriage which is
paramount to the interests of the parties themselves.6 5 The national aware-
ness of the problem is reflected in courses in marital preparation and rela-
tions given by colleges, the dissemination of marital literature and the de-
velopment of marriage counselling centers in forty states. 6
60. MUDD 4.
61. Ibid.
62. NrW YoRK WORLD TrLGRAm, THx WoRLD ALMANAC 375 (1957).
63. The divorce rate steadily increased from 1890 to 1946. Since then, the number
of divorces per unit population has decreased. The number of divorces is tied very
closely to the marriage rate, i.e., a year of many marriages is usually a year of many
divorces, 7 ENcyc. BRIrANicA 460-61 (1954 ed.). However, the ratio of divorces to
marriages has been increasing. Nzw YORK WORLD To.ZeGRAm, WORLD ALAIANAC 375
(1957). See Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw & CONTSAIP. PROB. 49
(1954) ; Ellzey, Marriage or Divorce, 22 U. KAN. CiTY L. RZv. 9 (1953).
64. Johnstone, Divorce Dismissals: A Field Study, 1 KAN. L. Rzv. 245 (1953).
See also Vmiruz, FAMIY CouRTs (1956); Alexander, Family Cases are Different-
Why not Family Courts?, 3 KAN. L. REv. 26, 32 (1954).
65. MacKensie, Spiritual Values and the Family Court, 18 LAW & CONT4MP.
PROB. 20, 22 (1953). See also Chute, supra note 63; Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy,
18 LAW & CON M P. PROB. 26, 32 (1953).
66. MUDD 6, 11; Ellzey, supra note 63, at 16.
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The establishment of family courts, 67 perhaps the most significant
divorce reform currently being advocated, 8 has revealed an important area
within which marriage counselling can be useful, despite the fact that
divorce is being considered by the parties.
In a large percentage of cases in a recent study, filing of suit for divorce
was done for the admitted purpose of bringing the recalcitrant spouse
"into line." 69 Although statistics are meagre, this hypothesis has been
strengthened by the fact that in many cases reconciliation results if there
is a delay in the proceedings.70 Despite the fact that less than ten per cent
of divorce actions are contested, 71 there is a high percentage of dismissals. 72
These figures, though far from conclusive, suggest that a substantial num-
ber of people with marital difficulties do not "want" divorce even after
filing.73 Consequently, the dismissal rate might be significantly higher
were reconciliation services available.
Despite the growing number of family courts, they are by no means a
full solution to the divorce problem. 74  Since few courts have adequate
programs for reconciliation at the present time 75 the full burden of ex-
ploring the possibility of saving a marriage usually falls on the lawyer.
Unfortunately, the lawyer is generally ill-equipped to handle the psycho-
logical and emotional issues which blend with the legal issues in a family
breakdown. 76 The fact that there appears to be an opportunity for the
beneficial exercise of the counsellor's special knowledge, however, does not
necessarily mean that he can in fact save a large number of otherwise hope-
less marriages. Until there are statistics available to indicate a comparison
between the divorce rate with and without counselling, it would seem pre-
mature to grant a privilege to an unproved profession. But until family
67. A family court is an expanded juvenile court having the two-fold purpose of
guidance and adjudication. Johnstone, Family Courts, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. XRzv. 18
(1953). The most important feature of this broadened jurisdiction is considered to be
the presence of reconciliation services and general marriage counselling. Johnstone,
supra at 19.
68. Johnstone, Divorce Dismissals: A Field Study, I KAN. L. Riv. 245, 255
(1953).
69. Johnstone, supra note 68, at 254.
70. MacKensie, supra note 65, at 24.
71. Pilpel & Zavin, Separation Agreements: Their Function and Future, 18 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 33, 34 (1953) ; Sayre, supra note 65, at 27.
72. Johnstone, supra note 68, at 245.
73. Johnstone, supra note 68, at 255. See also MacKensie, supra note 65, at 24.
74. The nearest approach has probably been achieved in the Circuit Court of To-
ledo, Ohio, where two full-time marriage counsellors are available at no charge in
cases referred by lawyers. Chute, supra note 65, at 53. Other efforts have culminated in
legislation in several states requiring reports by probation officers whenever the custody
of minor children is involved. Chute, supra note 65, at 60; Alexander, supra note 64,
at 31-32. Some difficulty has been experienced with constitutional issues, see, e.g.,
Christianson v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954), but the main objection to
family courts has been the expense involved and the delays necessarily incident to a
proper investigation of case backgrounds. Johnstone, supra note 68, at 20. In addition,
there is a natural reticence on the part of lawyers who feel that the social worker and
counsellor are usurping the legal function. Ibid.
75. Pilpel & Zavin, supra note 71, at 37.
76. Pilpel & Zavin, supra note 71, at 36, 38. See also Mariano, Legal Therapy in
Divorce, 3 KAN. L. Rxv. 36, 37-40 (1954).
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courts are able to assume the burden, perhaps a compromise solution would
be to grant counsellors a privilege whenever there is a reference by an
attorney. If counselling proves to avert divorce in a substantial percentage
of the cases it should certainly be "sedulously fostered"; until then, this
criterion seems the weak link in a claim for a counselling privilege.
Is the Injury That Would Inure to the Relation by the Disclosure of the
Communications Greater Than the Benefit Thereby Gained for the
Correct Disposal of Litigation?
It is apparent that the injury to the correct.disposal of litigation will
be proportional to the amount of evidence excluded, which in turn is re-
lated, although not necessarily in direct proportion, to the scope of the
privilege. To be effective, a counselling privilege must at least enable the
communicating spouse to prevent disclosure of his confidential statement-
by either the other spouse or the marriage counsellor. It may even be
desirable to permit the noncommunicating spouse to bar introduction of
confidential statements by the communicating spouse if admission would
require the introduction of otherwise privileged statements in rebuttal.
77
As to the types of actions in which the privilege may be exercised, the
minimum necessary privilege would encompass marital actions between
the spouses. At the other extreme, the privilege could be extended to
include all actions, whether between the spouses or involving third parties.
The argument for a limited privilege, aside from the fact that less evidence
would be excluded overall, is that the spouses at the time of the conference
are concerned only with possible marital litigation, hence require only an
assurance that their statements will not be admissible in such actions; and
if the privilege is limited to such actions, its primary impact will be upon
the spouses rather than upon third parties.
The case for the broad privilege rests on the assumption that anything
short of a complete assurance by the marriage counsellor of confidentiality
will make the client reticent to reveal the amount of information necessary
for effective counselling. Moreover, statements made in counselling con-
ferences will generally be relevant only to subsequent marital litigation.78
The frequency with which statements would be relevant in other types of
actions is small, hence little additional evidence is lost by the broader
privilege. Balancing this against the asserted gain to the counsellor from
a full assurance of confidentiality, the broader privilege seems desirable.
77. McTaggart v. McTaggart, [19481 2 All E.R. 754, 755 (C.A.) (dictum);
Walker v. Wilsher, [1889] 23 Q.B. 335 (on issue of awarding costs, defendant's evi-
dence that prior to suit he offered plaintiff the same sum as his judgment held priv-
ileged). See also Without Prejudice, 92 Sor- J. 653 (1948). There may be value in
guaranteeing that a statement cannot be introduced in evidence if either the communi-
cant or noncommunicant should object. Otherwise, the parties might be tempted to
color their statemets in the hopes of later introduction, which in turn would hamper
the counselling process. See note 80 in!fra.
78. All the English cases dealing with this privilege have been divorce proceed-
ings. See cases cited at note 21 supra.
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In determining whether any privilege should be granted, the focus
should be on marital actions. Although the privilege withdraws one source
of proof, other sources are available in many of the situations involved.
For example, if the claimant of the privilege is a party in a divorce action,
the other spouse can testify from personal knowledge of conduct such as
cruelty, failure to support or neglect. On the other hand, there may be
lack of adequate evidence of adultery, or in annulment actions, of facts
bearing on the validity of the marriage. Similarly, conversations relevant
to show defendant's state of mind, such as lack of rationality or animosity
toward the spouse, may be otherwise unobtainable and lost if a privilege is
granted. Such grounds for divorce or annulment as a prior subsisting
marriage or a previous commitment for mental disorder may also be outside
the present spouse's knowledge. If these grounds are suspected, however,
they should be readily proved from public records or by putting the de-
fendant on the stand.
The balance against the injury to the proper disposal of litigation is
the benefit to the relationship of counsellor and client to be gained from
the existence of the privilege. This benefit inures to society as well if the
counsellor is able either to prevent divorce or to reconcile the parties to
that eventuality!7
9
Thus, if divorce is avoided, the testimony should be privileged under
the same rationale which excludes offers of compromise in the interests of
preventing litigation. If divorce is unavoidable, then the public has bene-
fited from the correct disposal of the marital problem by eliminating the
adversary aspect of the case.
To WHOM SHOULD THE PRIVILEGE EXTEND?
The question remains as to who should qualify as a marriage counsellor
for purposes of a privilege. The privilege contemplated would extend to all
communications made to a counsellor in order to avoid marital difficulties
as well as to solve problems which have already arisen. The prevalence of
informal marital advice given during conversations when other information
might be revealed could permit the frequent claim of privilege. It is ap-
parent that the possibility of abuse is too great to allow a privilege to extend
to informal counselling.
80
79. It would seem reasonable that in a large percentage of cases intelligent coun-
selling could at least result in diminishing contested divorces by educating both parties
to that course if it is the most desirable alternative. This might well result in fuller
voluntary disclosures by those concerned, thereby eliminating the adversary aspect of
marital cases.
80. The privilege of the English cases is not limited to communications to persons
meeting formal standards of professional competence. McTaggart v. McTaggart,
[1948] 2 All E.R. 754 (C.A.) (probation officer of magistrate's court) ; Pool v. Pool,
[195112 All E.R. 563 (P.D.A.) (attorney); Broome v. Broome, [1955] 1 All E.R.
201 (P.D.A.) (representative of servicemen's association) ; Henley v. Henley, [1955]
1 All E.R. 590 (P.D.A.) (country vicar). This recognition is an outgrowth of the
protection that English courts have given to all communications made "without prej-
udice" during the course of negotiations where litigation is pending or likely. Hoghton
v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278, 315, 321 (1852); La Roche v. Armstrong, [1922] 1 K.B.
PRIVILEGE FOR MARRIAGE COUNSELORS
Determination of who qualifies as a counsellor for purposes of a privilege
is made difficult by the absence of formal standards to determine competence.
At the present time marriage counselling is not licensed as a profession; in
fact, there is considerable controversy in the profession itself as to whether
licensing would be desirable. 8' A satisfactory compromise would appear
to be to require strict compliance with qualifications for membership in a
recognized group such as the American Association of Marriage Counsel-
lors. These usually include a graduate degree in one of the social sciences
or a professional degree with a minor in social science, and commonly
three or more years of experience in field work.8 2  Indeed, it might be
advantageous to require membership in a recognized association in addition
to the meeting of certain minimum standards of competence set by that
association. The association could thus act as a policing agency to protect
the ethics of the practice in the absence of licensing requirements.
An additional problem is presented by the inter-professional activities
of many marriage counsellors. Thus, many who practice do so not as
members of counselling agencies or even as free lance full-time counsellors.
Figures of the American Association of Marriage Counsellors indicate
that fifty-six per cent of the membership carry on counselling as a part of
their day-to-day practice in another field, while only six per cent are
privately engaged in full time counselling.83 The counsellor's privilege
should extend only to activities which he performs in that capacity. This
poses the question of when counselling begins and the other activity breaks
off.
485 (cited in McTaggart v. McTaggart, supra). One explanation is that the privilege
furthers the desirable aim of settling disputes by protecting statements made during
negotiations. When divorce is involved there is an additional rationale. "[I~n matri-
monial disputes, the State is also an interested party and is more interested in recon-
ciliation than in divorce, and if the rule as to privilege tends to promote the prospects
of reconciliation, I think it ought to be applied .... " Mole v. Mole, [1950] 2 All E.R.
328, 329 (C.A.). If the third party were ". . . compelled to give evidence as to what
was said in the course of negotiations, it would mean that, when he attempted recon-
ciliation, he would not be told the truth, or, at all events not the whole truth. The
parties would have at the back of their minds the thought that whatever they said
might be given in evidence against them or for them, and would colour their statements
accordingly. There is no chance of reconciliation unless the parties are able to talk
with frankness .... " McTaggart v. McTaggart, supra at 756. Since the primary em-
phasis of the English privilege is avoidance of divorce, a communication cannot qualify
unless "litigation is imminent." McTaggart v. McTaggart, uPra at 755, or there is at
least an "occasion for reconciliation." Broome v. Broome, supra at 205. In addition,
the third party must have been acting in his "capacity as conciliator." Id. at 207, and
there must have been a "tacit understanding that the communications were without
prejudice ... ." Pool v. Pool, supra at 566. Although this privilege appears liberal in
protecting all confidential communications made with a view toward reconciliation, it
fails to protect communications made to avoid the difficulties which give rise to a need
for reconciliation. Protection of these latter statements compels a requirement that the
counsellor meet some professional standard of competence.
81. This springs in large measure from a fear on the part of licensed physicians
that others, through marriage counselling, may be placed in a position to do work for
which they are not qualified and by which they could do considerable harm. Compare
Stokes, Legal Status of the Marriage Counsellor, 13 MARRIAGE & FAmILY LWNG 113
(1951), with Ellis, Legal Status of the Marriage Counsellor, 13 MARPIAGE & FAMILY
LivING 116 (1951).
82. MiDD 64-66.
83. MUDD 71.
19571
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An analogous problem arises when, in the course of marriage coun-
selling the counsellor refers the client to a specialist for advanced treatment.
In reference cases the privilege might continue at least when the treat-
ment is necessary to the marriage therapy, and the counsellor maintains
some administrative supervision over the client's case. This would have
the effect of encouraging reference cases when the counsellor himself is
unqualified to handle that aspect of the treatment.
CONCLUSION
Although the trend of the law has been to narrow privileges for con-
fidential communications, it has been suggested that marriage counselling
may be deserving of consideration for this legal protection. The benefits
to be obtained from its use may prove considerable in view of the exten-
sive social and economic problems created by the large divorce rate. The
therapy which is used requires that the communications be held in con-
fidence. Privileges currently enjoyed by counsellors arising out of their
professions as doctors, lawyers and clergymen appear inadequate to protect
the counselling function and raise additional problems of waiver when there
is joint therapy. On the other hand, the beneficial effect which counselling
may have on the divorce problem has not been fully evaluated and it would
appear unwise to grant a privilege to a new profession without a guarantee
as to its effectiveness. A suggested orientation is to encourage lawyers to
make references to counsellors and to allow a privilege in this limited case.
This could have the result of elevating the prestige of the profession in the
public's eyes, and at the same time encouraging the person with marital
difficulties to derive the utmost benefit by a free communication in the
knowledge that his confidences cannot be divulged.
D. A., III
